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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
SCOTT D. OAKEY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030751-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed plain error in submitting the second degree 
burglary charge to the jury when there was insufficient evidence to establish that the 
cabin in question was a dwelling? To establish plain error in the context of an 
insufficiency claim, "a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a conviction of the crime charged...." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 71* ^[17,10 P.3d 
346. Then the defendant must show "that the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at f l7. 
Although this issue was not preserved below, an unpreserved claim can be addressed on 
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appeal if the "defendant can demonstrate that... 'plain error' occurred." Id. at 111 
(citations omitted). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Scott D. Oakey appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fourth District Court after being convicted by a jury of burglary, a second degree felony, 
and theft, a class B misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Scott D. Oakey was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on or about October 24,2002 with count 1: burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202; count 2: theft, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-404; and count 3: criminal mischief, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-l-6(2)(c)(d) (R. 1-2). 
Jury trial was held on May 21, 2003 (R. 192). Oakey was found guilty of 
burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a class B misdemeanor (R. 192: 107; 112). 
On August 27, 2003, Oakey was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State prison for burglary, a second 
degree felony (R. 163). Prison term was suspended (R. 163). Based on Oakey's 
conviction for theft, a class B misdemeanor, he was sentenced to a term of six months in 
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jail, the total time suspended (R. 163). The court ordered that the last 90 days of the jail 
sentence to be served in jail industries (R. 163). Oakey was also ordered to pay 
restitution, joint and several, in the amount of $2,263.70 (R. 172). 
On September 10, 2003, Oakey filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Utah Court 
of Appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment entered in the above case (R. 
174). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Testimony of Craig Pickering 
Craig Pickering testified that he owns a cabin in Hobble Creek Canyon, near 
Springville, Utah (R. 192: 47). He built the cabin in 1996 (R. 192: 47). 
Around June 30, 2002, Pickering went with his wife to visit the cabin for the first 
time that year and discovered that the back door window had been broken and the door 
had been opened (R. 192: 48). They entered the cabin and noticed mud footprints 
throughout the cabin as well as several items missing and some damage (R.T92: 48). 
Pickering testified that the missing items included: "Atlantic brand center channel 
speaker, Harmon Carter brand audio/video receiver, CD changer, Mitsubishi brand VCR, 
Atlantic brand base speaker, Atlantic brand front channel speaker, ..., Mitsubishi 36-inch 
TV, and a leather sofa" (R. 192: 49). 
Pickering made a claim with his insurance company for the stolen items and 
received "reimbursement for approximately half of the original purchase price amount" 
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(R. 192: 52). The insurance company paid Pickering $2892.68 for the stolen items (R. 
192: 53). 
Pickering testified that he did not give James Ewing or Scott Oakey permission to 
enter his cabin and take the items listed above (R. 192: 54). 
B. Testimony of James Ewing 
James Ewing lives with his parents in Springville, Utah (R. 192: 56). Currently he 
resides at the Highland Ridge Hospital in Salt Lake where he is undergoing therapy for 
drug abuse (R. 192: 57). 
Ewing knows the Pickering family through their son (R. 192: 57). Ewing had 
been snowmobiling with their son and had been to the Pickering's cabin a few times 
before he burglarized it (R. 192: 58). 
In the beginning of April 2002, Ewing decided to burglarize the cabin and take the 
TV so he could get money in order to buy drugs (R. 192: 58, 69, 72). Ewing had been 
friends with Oakey for about ten years and he was a neighbor (R. 192: 58). Ewing went 
to Oakey's house and asked him if he would go with him to the cabin and "take" some 
things (R. 192: 59). 
Ewing testified that at around noon, they both drove together in his car and went to 
the cabin (R. 192: 60). Ewing originally planned to only take the TV (R. 192: 59). The 
back doors were locked so Oakey broke the window and they entered the cabin (R. 192: 
60-61). They took the whole entertainment center, including the VCR, a CD player, 
some speakers, and the TV (R. 192: 61). They loaded these items in Ewing's car and 
"hurried and got out of there" (R. 192: 62). 
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Ewing and Oakey went to a Provo pawnshop and attempted to pawn the stolen 
items, but they did not have the remotes to the TV so Ewing sold the items to Jed Hansen 
instead (R. 192: 63). Ewing got $400 for the stolen items and gave Oakey only around 
$100 (R. 192: 63). Ewing used the money to buy drugs (R. 192: 67). Hansen was 
Ewing's friend and he did not know Oakey (R. 192: 64). 
Ewing went back to the cabin two other times with people other than Oakey (R. 
192: 64). The second time he went with Tom Foote (R. 192: 64). The two stole a leather 
couch from the cabin (R. 192: 64). The cabin was already open from the previous 
burglary (R. 192: 64). 
During the third burglary, Ewing went with Jed Hansen and a friend of Hansen's 
back to the cabin to get the remotes for Hie entertainment center (R. 192: 64-65). They 
took the remotes and also speakers from the walls (R. 192: 65). 
On July 17,2002, Detective Shawn Cowden spoke with Ewing about the cabin 
and the missing items (R. 192: 65). At first, Ewing denied any involvement or 
knowledge of the thefts, but he changed his story within five minutes and confessed (R. 
192: 65-66). Subsequently, Ewing plead guilty to three counts of burglary, class A 
misdemeanors, three counts of theft, class A misdemeanors, and one count of theft, a 
class B misdemeanor (R. 192: 66). Ewing also plead guilty to one count of criminal 
mischief (R. 192: 67). Ewing's sentence did not include any jail time (R. 192: 69). 
C. Testimony of Shawn Cowden 
Shawn Cowden works with the Utah County Sheriffs Office, and he investigated 
the burglary of a cabin in Hobble Creek Canyon around July 2002 (R. 192: 77). Cowden 
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met Pickering at the cabin and took pictures of the cabin, noting the broken window, 
muddy footprints, and other damaged areas (R. 192: 78). 
Through investigation, Cowden focused his attention on Ewing and asked Ewing 
to come speak with him (R. 192: 79): Ewing at first denied any involvement with the 
burglary, but within five minutes Ewing changed his story and confessed that he and 
several other people were involved (R. 192: 79). Ewing stated that Scott Oakey, Thomas 
Foote, and Jed Hansen were also involved (R. 192: 80). 
Cowden also questioned Oakey about the cabin, but Oakey denied any knowledge 
of the incident (R. 192: 80). 
Cowden testified that most of the stolen property was in Hansen's possession and 
most of the property was recovered (R. 192: 81). Both Hansen and Foote confessed of 
their involvement (R. 192: 81). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Oakey asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the cabin 
which was allegedly burglarized was a "dwelling" under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
202(2). The only evidence the State submitted to the jury regarding the status of the 
cabin was the owner's testimony that he visited the cabin at least once in the year it was 
burglarized. Because the evidence was clearly insufficient to support the second degree 
burglary charge, the trial court committed plain error in submitting this charge to the jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT THE 
CABIN IN QUESTION WAS A "DWELLING" AND THEREFORE IT 
WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SUBMIT THE 
SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY CHARGE TO THE JURY 
The specific question before this Court is whether the State presented insufficient 
evidence to qualify the cabin in question as a dwelling under Utah Code Annotated § 76-
6-202? Oakey asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he burglarized a 
"dwelling" since the State presented insufficient evidence that the burglarized cabin was 
"abuilding which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night...." Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-6-201. Therefore, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the 
second degree burglary charge to the jury and Oakey respectfully asks this court to 
reduce his conviction to a third degree felony. 
A. It Was Plain Error To Submit the Second Degree Felony Burglary 
Charge to the Jury. 
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant must 
demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime 
charged...." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 71, % 17, 10 P.3d 346. "To demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must 
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 
1999 UT 98,1fl4, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 
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799 (Utah 1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^18 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must 
show "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at fl7. 
1. The marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the second degree 
felony burglary conviction. 
In State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992), the defendant was convicted of 
second degree burglary for taking two hunting bows from a cabin located in the La Sal 
Mountains in San Juan County. Id. at 657-58. One of the issues on appeal involved 
whether the cabin was a "dwelling" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
202(2) and whether it was error for the trial court to not dismiss the second degree felony 
burglary charge. Id. at 662. The owner of the cabin testified that while no one lived in 
the cabin on a daily basis, he spent two or three days a week at his cabin. Id. at 658. 
This Court examined the plain language of Utah Code § 76-6-202(2) and § 76-6-
201 and determined that "[t]he term 'usually occupied' refers to the purpose for which 
the structure is used. If the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight, it 
fits within the definition of dwelling under the burglary statute." Cox, 826 P.2d at 662. 
This Court also looked to a similar Michigan statute, referring to an "occupied dwelling," 
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which was considered in People v. McClain, 306 N.W.2d 497 (Mich. App. 1981), and 
noted that that court "concluded that the term included a house under construction in 
which the owner slept only on weekends and holidays...." Id. 
This Court then held in Cox that "our second degree burglary statute is intended to 
protect people while in places where they are likely to be living and sleeping overnight, 
as opposed to protecting property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or 
garages." 826 P.2d at 662. Based on this analysis, this Court upheld the defendant's 
conviction, finding that the cabin in question was a dwelling because he lived at the cabin 
at least two or three times a week. Id. 
In the present case, the State presented evidence that a cabin located in Hobble 
Creek Canyon, near Springville, Utah, was burglarized on three occasions between early 
April 2002 and June 30,2002 (R. 192: 48, 69). The owner, Craig Pickering, discovered 
the burglaries around June 30,2002 (R. 192: 48). James Ewing testified that he 
burglarized the cabin on those three occasions, and that during the first burglary, Oakey 
was his accomplice (R. 192: 59-61). Oakey was subsequently convicted for burglary of 
a dwelling, a second degree felony (R. 192: 107). 
However, the State presented no evidence that Pickering or his family used the 
cabin as a residence or as living quarters even on a temporary basis. In fact, Pickering 
testified that June 30, 2002, "was the first time we had visited [the cabin] that year" (R. 
192: 48). Thus, the only evidence the jury heard as to whether the cabin was a dwelling 
or a "place[] where [people] are likely to be living and sleeping overnight" was 
Pickering's testimony that he visited the cabin at least once that year. See Cox, 826 P.2d 
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at 662. Although Ewing testified that he had been to the cabin on prior occasions, there 
was no testimony that anyone lived at the cabin or slept there overnight (R. 192: 58). 
The only evidence given pertaining to whether or not the cabin was used as a 
dwelling was Pickering's testimony that he visited the cabin for the first time around June 
30, 2002 (R. 192: 48). There was no evidence, like in Cox, that Pickering lived in the 
cabin two or three days out of the week. Therefore, Oakey asserts that there was 
insufficient evidence that the cabin in question was a dwelling within the meaning of 
Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-202(2) and 76-6-201 because there was no evidence that 
the cabin was even occupied at any time during the night. 
The State failed in its burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the cabin 
was a "dwelling" within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202(2). Because 
there was insufficient evidence to establish all the elements of the second degree burglary 
charge, "reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 18 
(citation omitted). 
2. The trial court plainly erred in submitting the second degree 
burglary charge to the jury. 
Although Oakey's trial counsel failed to ask the trial court to dismiss the second 
degree burglary charge due to insufficient evidence, an unpreserved claim can be 
addressed on appeal if the "defendant can demonstrate that... 'plain error' occurred." 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 11 (citations omitted). 
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As shown above, the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict 
"is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must 
have entertained reasonable doubt" that Oakey committed second degree burglary 
because there was insufficient evidence that the cabin was used as a "dwelling." See 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 18. Oakey asserts that this insufficiency "was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." See Id. at ^ 17. 
During closing argument, the Prosecutor argued that the cabin was in fact a 
dwelling, and specifically pointed out to the jury that Jury Instruction # 9 defines a 
dwelling (R. 192: 97-98). The Prosecutor further argued that the purpose of a dwelling is 
to "sleep there" (R. 192: 98). The trial court heard all the evidence and it should have 
been obvious to the trial court that no evidence had been given declaring that any person 
slept at the cabin or used the cabin as a dwelling as defined in Utah Code Annotated § 76-
6-201 or further clarified in Cox. 
Accordingly, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the second degree 
burglary charge to the jury when it was evident that the State failed to show that the cabin 
in question was in fact a "dwelling". 
B. In the Alternative, Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Dismissal of 
the Second Degree Burglary Charge Constituted Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel. 
Oakey's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a dismissal of the second degree 
burglary charge because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge. But for 
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this deficient performance, Oakey's conviction would have been a lesser third degree 
felony. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to move to dismiss a 
charge for insufficient evidence "succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient 
to support a conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See 
also Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 
S.Ct. 706, 126 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure 
to move to dismiss the evidence to convict was sufficient)). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, .^25, 1 P.3d 546 (citation omitted). 
As shown above, the State failed to produce evidence that the cabin in question 
qualified as a dwelling within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202(2). 
Trial counsel's failure to move for a dismissal of the second degree burglary 
charge constituted deficient performance and but for this failure, this charge would not 
have been submitted to the jury and Oakey would not have been convicted of second 
degree burglary. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Oakey asks this Court to reverse his conviction for 
burglary, a second degree felony, and reduce his conviction to burglary, a third degree 
felony. In the alternative, Oakey asks this Court to remand this matter to the District 
Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of June, 2004. 
Margaret P 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this -f*day of June, 2004. 
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ADDENDA 
337 UTAH CRIMINAL GODE 76-6-206 
(c) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indict-
ment is returned, shall cause to be subscribed upon the 
information or indictment notice tha t the defendant is 
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this 
section. 
(3) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed any criminal offense with the intent 
to halt, impede, obstruct, or interfere with the lawful opera-
tion of an animal enterprise or to damage, take, or cause the 
loss of any property owned by, used by, or in the possession of 
a lawful animal enterprise, the penalties are enhanced as 
provided in this Subsection (3): 
(a) a class C misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor, 
with a mandatory fine of not less than $1,000, which is in 
addition to any term of imprisonment the court may 
impose; 
(b) a class B misdemeanor is a class A misdemeanor, 
with a fine of not less than $2,500, which is in addition to 
any term of imprisonment the court may impose; 
(c) a class A misdemeanor is a third degree felony, with 
a fine of not less than $5,000, which is in addition to any 
term of imprisonment the court may impose; 
(d) a third degree felony is a second degree felony, with 
a fine of not less than $7,500, which is in addition to any 
term of imprisonment the court may impose; and 
(e) a second degree felony is subject to a fine of not less 
than $10,000, which is in addition to any term of impris-
onment the court may impose. 2001 
PART 2 
BURGLARY AND CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
76-6-201. Definitions. 
>For the purposes of this part: 
(1) bu i ld ing ," in addition to its ordinary meaning, 
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or 
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accom-
modation of persons or for carrying on business therein 
and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of 
the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected 
with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occu-
pied by a person lodging therein a t night, whether or not 
a person is actually present. 
• (3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon 
premises when the premises or any portion thereof a t the 
time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public 
arid when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged 
to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof. 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) intrusion of any par t of the body; or 
(b) intrusion of any physical object under control of 
the actor. ISTO 
R202. Burglary. 
IP An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
te&lly in a building or any portion of a building with 
gS: t° commit: 
(a) a felony; 
* ) theft; 
(c) an assault on any person; 
W) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1); 
fa) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3); 
u) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 
76
-9-702 5, or 
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-
702.7(2) or (5). 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any 
of the offenses listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and 
which may be committed by the actor while he is in the 
building. 2003 
76-6-203. Aggravated burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempt-
ing, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or 
another participant in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the 
crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dan-
gerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the 
same definition as under Section 76-1-601. 1989 
76-6-204. Burglary of a vehic le — Charge of other 
offense. 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any vehicle with 
intent to commit a felony or theft is guilty of a burglary of a 
vehicle. 
(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) A charge against any person for a violation of Subsection 
(1) shall not preclude a charge for a commission of any other 
offense. 1973 
76-6-205. Manufacture or possession of instrument for 
burglary or theft. 
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, 
tool, device, article, or other thing adapted, designed, or 
commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of 
any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use 
or knowledge tha t some person intends to use the same in the 
commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 1973 
76-6-206. Criminal trespass . 
(1) For purposes of this section, "enter" means intrusion of 
the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circum-
stances not amounting to burglary as denned in Section 
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204 or a violation of Section 
76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any 
person or damage to any property, including the use 
of graffiti as denned in Section 76-6-107; 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other t h a n theft 
or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will 
cause fear for the safety of another; 
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice against 
entering is given by: 
(i) personal communication to the actor by the 
owner or someone with apparent authority to act for 
the owner; 
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed 
to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to 
the attention of intruders; or 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
In order for you find the Defendant guilty of the offense of Count 1: Burglary, you must find 
that each of the following essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have been established 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That Scott Oakey, 
2. on or about June 30,2002, 
3. did enter or remain in a dwelling or any portion of the dwelling, 
4. with the intent to commit a theft. 
OR THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
1. That Scott Oakey, 
2. on or about June 30,2002, 
3. did enter or remain in a building or any portion of the building, 
4. with the intent to commit a theft. 
Ifthe State has failed to prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of 
the essential elements of the crime charged, you should find the defendant not guilty. But if the State has 
proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt all of the essential elements of the offense as set forth 
above, then you should find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the Information. 
;QQ138 
INSTRUCTION NO. _2 
A "dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, 
whether or not a person is actually present. 
GG134 
INSTRUCTION NO. -jO 
You are instructed that a "building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any 
watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein and includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle. 
